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This paper shows that, in the absence of a complete set of risk
markets, prices provide incorrect signals for guiding production
decisions. Even if all individuals have rational expectations con-
cerning the distribution of prices which will prevail on the market
next period, the market allocation is, in general, not a constrained
Pareto optimum. Essentially the only conditions under which, for all
technologies, the market equilibrium is a constrained Pareto op-
timum are those in which risk markets are redundant. We derive the
necessary and sufficient conditions for redundancy of risk markets,
which turn out to be extremely restrictive.
I. Introduction
This paper shows that, in the absence of a complete set of risk
markets, prices provide incorrect signals for guiding production deci-
sions. More precisely, we establish that, even if all individuals have
rational expectations concerning tbe distribution of prices which will
prevail on the market next period, the market allocation is, in general.
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not a constrained Pareto optimum. In other words, if we constrain the
government to work within the same set of markets, not allowing it
either directly or surreptitiously to alter the set of available markets, it
would make different production decisions. As a consequence, there
exists a set of taxes/subsidies which would generate a Pareto im-
provement. There are some very special cases where the market
equilibrium is a constrained Pareto optimum; these, unfortunately,
include some of the more commonly employed parameterizations
(e.g., logarithmic utility functions and multiplicative risk). Writers
who make these assumptions for analytic convenience may not fully
appreciate what strong implications these assumptions have for mar-
ket efficiency.
It is, of course, well known that if there were a complete set of risk
markets the competitive market equilibrium would be Pareto optimal.
When there does not exist a complete set of risk markets, a number of
questions arise concerning the definition, existence, and optimality of
market equilibrium (see, e.g., Diamond 1967; Radner 1968, 1972;
Stiglitz 1972, 1975; Dreze 1974; Hart 1975).
This paper is concerned only with the optimality properties of
competitive equilibria with rational expectations. We first establish a
general characterization theorem providing a necessary condition for
the market equilibrium to be Pareto optimal (Sec. III). We then look
for restrictions on consumers' and producers' utility functions which
will ensure that the economy is a constrained Pareto optimum for all
specifications of the technology. We show (Sec. IV) that a necessary
and sufficient condition is that the utility functions be such that risk
markets are redundant; that is, even if they existed, there would be
no trade on them. We provide, moreover, a set of necessary and
sufficient conditions for redundancy of risk markets: If the output of
all producers is perfectly correlated, we require that either (a) all
consumers have a logarithmic utility function; or (b) all producers be
risk neutral, and all consumers have utility functions for which the
marginal utility of income is independent of price.
If the outputs of different producers are not perfectly correlated,
only condition (a) obtains (Sec. X).
These conditions are, as we have said, extremely restrictive and,
thus, there is a strong presumption that the market economy is not a
constrained Pareto optimum (Sec. VII). On the other hand, using
standard approximation techniques, we show that the welfare loss
associated with this market imperfection may not be particularly seri-
ous (Sec. VIII).
The reason for the nonoptimality is simple: Relative price variabil-
ity is a source of risk. Since each firm is competitive, it cannot benefit
from the fact that its production decision changes the variability of
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prices. In a complete market, this would be a pecuniary externality,
and the firm would be able to profit directly from reducing consum-
ers' risk. In an incomplete market, this is impossible by assumption. In
the concluding section of the paper, we provide some further inter-
pretations of this class of market failures.
The question which we address here is, of course, not a new one:
Diamond (1967) considered an economy in which there was a single
output: All firms had multiplicative uncertainty (i.e., the level of
investment did not affect the relative outputs in different states of
nature), and no firm had any choice of technique. Under these re-
strictive assumptions, he established the constrained optimality of
market equilibrium (where the notion of constrained optimality is
precisely that employed here).
Several subsequent studies (Stiglitz 1972, 1975; Dreze 1974; Hart
1975) cast doubt on the generality of Diamond's results. Hart, in
particular, while providing a set of (restrictive) sufficient conditions
under which the market equilibrium has certain optimality prop-
erties, provides a number of interesting examples demonstrating that,
when these conditions are not satisfied, the market equilibrium may
not be a constrained Pareto optimum. Our paper differs from Hart's
in two important ways: (a) Hart's analysis was limited to an exchange
economy and, thus, the inefficiencies which he noted were exchange
inefficiencies; we are concerned with productive efficiency, (b) While
Hart provided sufficient conditions for optimality, we provide neces-
sary and sufficient conditions; these conditions not only demonstrate
that there is a strong presumption for the nonoptimality of the mar-
ket equilibrium but provide considerable insight into the nature of the
market failure. Moreover, they enable us to derive policies which lead
to Pareto improvements in welfare and to estimate the magnitude of
the welfare losses associated with nonintervention.
The other important work to which our results should be related is
that of Grossman (1977) and Grossman and Hart (1979). They pro-
vide a characterization of the sense in which incomplete markets are
optimal: "Let there be a different planner at each date and in each
event. Assume that the planner at each date-event is permitted to
make arbitrary transfers of goods using only the markets which are
open in the competitive economy, but that there is no coordination of
actions between the planners at different date-events—in other
words, the planners play a Nash game with each other. Define an
allocation to be a social Nash optimum (SNO) if, given the actions
of other planners, each planner's transfers are Pareto optimal"
(Grossman and Hart 1979, p. 316). The essential difference between
our analysis and that of Grossman and Grossman and Hart is that, in
our analysis, the government does not take the transfers of goods in
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each state as given; these transfers are determined endogenously, as a
result of the working of the market. This implies that there may be
Pareto improvements from the imposition of investment taxes and
subsidies. In addition, we consider some taxes (like ad valorem output
taxes) which can be viewed as mechanisms by which the government
coordinates allocations across states of nature, a kind of coordination,
though plausible in practice, that Grossman does not allow his plan-
ners to undertake.
In this paper, we do not discuss alternative explanations of the
absence of a complete set of markets. Short of such an explanation,
there is always the concern that the proposed market intervention is
infeasible for the same reason that the markets are incomplete.^ In
this paper, we analyze a specific context in which equity markets are
absent because output is not observable (other than to the farmer
himself) but inputs are. Although in such an environment output
taxes and subsidies would not be feasible, input taxes/subsidies would
be, and, under certain circumstances, Pareto improvements can be
effected even with these limited instruments.
II. A Simple Model with Identical Farmers and Consumers
We examine these questions within the context of the simplest possi-
ble model. There are two groups within the population: farmers and
consumers. All farmers are identical, and all consumers are identical.
We first describe the farmers' behavior, then consumers', and finally
market equilibrium. In the next section, we define and analyze the
constrained Pareto optimum and compare it with the market equilib-
rium.
Farmers
All farmers are identical and must choose the level of some decision
variable, ^, at the start of the season, before the state of nature, 6 (e.g.,
the weather), is known. Output, q, is an increasing function of ^and 6,
and is concave in ^:
^O. (1)
' For instance, if the proposed policy intervention involves output taxes, the natural
question to ask is, given that it is assumed that the value of output can be obser\ed, is it
not reasonable to introduce securities the payments on which are contingent on the
value of output (equities)? And if these securities are introduced, would not the
efficiency of the market be restored? It is important to observe that the introduction of
equity markets would not alter the basic nonoptimality result (see Stiglitz, in press).
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If there are N farmers, aggregate output is
(2)
Since all farmers are identical, we can represent the action taken by a
single number (although in principle we should write down the action
taken by each farmer).
Each farmer takes the distribution of prices as given (this is the
natural generalization of the price-taking assumption of the conven-
tional nonstochastic model). Later, we shall discuss how this price
distribution is determined. As we shall see, it will depend on the
actions taken by all other farmers, the state of nature, and the income
of the consumers /:^
(3)
The income of a farmer in state 6 when he takes action f is thus
(4)
We assume the farmer has a concave utility function which depends
on both his income and the action he takes:
U = Uiy, ^), U, > 0, Uy, < 0, U,, ^ 0. (5)
(The marginal utility of income is positive but diminishing, and U is
concave in f.) He chooses f to maximize his expected utility
max£t/(Y, f), (6)
given expectations about prices,/?(^, 0, / ) , so that he sets
+ U,} = 0. (7)
Several special interpretations of this general model should be noted.
In one interpretation, f is a choice of technique. In that case, we
postulate that ^ changes the probability distribution of outcomes but
does not directly affect utility, that is, U^ = 0, A second interpretation
has ^ as the level of investment or the cost of purchased inputs such as
fertilizer. Then, net income of the farmer isy — ^, and we write U =
u{y — ^). In the third interpretation, ^ is the level of effort supplied by
the individual. If the individual's utility function is separable between
income and effort, U = u{y) - z(^), where z{^) is the disutility of
effort.
The action taken by the individual farmer is a function of his
^ If consumers do not have identical, homothetic indifference maps, it will also
depend on the distribution of income as well; but we shall assume that the distribution
of income remains invariant throughout the model.
2 28 JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY
expectations concerning the distribution of prices. If his expectations
are rational, that is, the expected price distribution corresponds to
the actual price distribution, then, since the latter will depend on the
actions taken by all other farmers, his action will depend on the
actions taken by all other farmers. The precise relationship depends,
however, on the properties of the demand functions of consumers, to
which we now turn.
Consumers
Consumers make their consumption decisions after the state of na-
ture and, hence, market prices are known. Their choices can, there-
fore, be described by an indirect utility function, which we represent
as a function of the price of this particular good, p, and money
income, /, the prices of all other goods being assumed constant. We
assume, again for simplicity, that (1) consumers' income does not
depend at all on producers' income or prices or the state of the world,
6. (This makes sense if production and consumption occur in differ-
ent locations, and consumers cannot or do not buy stock or speculate
on the price of the agricultural commodity. The assumption is for
simplicity and can be relaxed, as in Stiglitz [in press] without changing
the presumption of market inefficiency.) (2) Producers do not con-
sume the commodity which they produce at all (this again is a sim-
plifying assumption, not crucial to the analysis). (3) The price of the
given good does not have any significant effect on the price of other
goods, an assumption which makes sense for a commodity which is a
small part of consumers' budgets, or if other relative prices were
determined by a technology satisfying the nonsubstitution theorem.
The representative consumer thus has utility represented by the indi-
rect utility function Vip, I), and his demand q^, derived from Roy's
identity is
=
Aggregate demand, Z), of the M identical consumers is just
D=Mq^-^D{pJl (9)
a function of price and the income of the representative consumer.
Market Equilibrium
The market equilibrium price distribution is now easy to determine,
given the demand function (9): For each ^ and 6, there is a particular
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value of aggregate supply, Q{^, d), and the market-clearing price is
then the price which equates aggregate demand, D, to this supply:
(l{^,e)=D[p{^^dj)ji (10)
We described earlier the behavior of farmers. Recalling equation
(7) and now letting^(^, 6,1) be the solution to equation (10), since all
farmers are identical, a rational expectations market equilibrium is a
value of ^ * and a function /?(f*, 6, I) for which
^ (11)
and equation (10) is satisfied for all values of 6.
III. The Nonoptimality of Market Equilibrium
Introduction
We now wish to evaluate the market equilibrium described in the
previous section. To do this, we need to compare the welfare of
consumers and producers in the market equilibrium with that in some
other feasible allocation. In making the comparison, however, we
need to take into account the constraints on the set of markets. It is
obvious that, except under certain special cases (to be detailed below),
the marginal rate of substitution between income in different states of
nature will differ for different individuals, so long as there are not
markets which enable them to trade income in one state for income in
another. Thus, were it costless to establish new markets, clearly there
exists a resource allocation which is Pareto superior to the market
equilibrium. But this is an unfair (and probably irrelevant) compari-
son. We now wish to know, given the restrictions on the set of mar-
kets, whether there exists a Pareto-superior allocation. The answer is
that there almost always does. We first analyze the optimal resource
allocation assuming: (1) the government could directly control the
choice of technique, ^; (2) the government can engage in lump-sum
redistributions which are not state dependent;^ but (3) it cannot in-
troduce any new markets, in particular, it cannot introduce insurance
markets (on 6), futures markets (on/?), or stock markets. Later we ask
^ Obviously, if the government could make state-dependent lump-sum transfers, it
could equate all individuals' marginal rates of substitution across the states of nature
and achieve the same outcome as a complete set of markets.
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whether this constrained Pareto optimum is decentralizable (i.e., by
tax-subsidy policies).
Suppose the lump-sum subsidy to each of the N producers is s,
financed by a lump-sum tax on each of the M consumers of amount
Ns/M.






for values of \ 5= 0. By changing \ we can trace all points on the
utility-possibility frontier. This formulation assumes that the govern-
ment has full power to redistribute income, so that the only remaining
issue is the one under study of achieving an efficient allocation of
resources. We are concerned with characterizing the Pareto-efficient
allocations. Choosing s yields the first-order condition:
"^  - 0 . (13)
ds
Using Roy's identity (eq. 8), equation (10), and the fact thatN/" =
total supply, and Q = Mq^, total demand, we can rewrite (13):
) = O. (14)
The term dp/ds is found by implicit differentiation of demand, D[p,
I — (Ns/M)], which is fixed equal to the level of supply:
Q dp _Q dP/ds _ Q dP/dl oct)
N ds N dD/dp M dD/dp e '
where a is the fraction of consumer income spent on the commodity,
17 is the income elasticity of demand, and 6 is the (absolute value of
the) elasticity of demand. Equation (14) can be rewritten as
E{{kU,- Vj)[l-{ar)/e)]} = 0. (16)
Now choose ^ so that
From equation (7), in market equilibrium, the second term is zero.
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The first term can be simplified using Roy's identity (8) and noting
that:
M d^ M \ d^ / dp I M
We therefore have the following fundamental result.
Theorem la.—A necessary condition for the rational expectations
equilibrium to be a constrained Pareto optimum is that
= 0. (18)
= 0 is almost a sufficient condition for the rational expectations
equilibrium to be a constrained Pareto optimum. We have, however,
not yet ruled out the possibility that the Lagrangian has several critical
points; the market equilibrium may correspond to one of these (so 5
= 0), but this may not be a global maximum. It is easy to establish the
following theorem, however.
Theorem Ib.—A sufficient condition for the market to be con-
strained Pareto optimal is that 56 be concave in s and ^ and, at the
market allocation, ^'", 5(f'") = 0.
We shall show below that only under unusual circumstances will B
= 0 at the market equilibrium, and it follows that only under even
more unusual circumstances will 5 = 0 at the market equilibrium and
the market not be a constrained Pareto optimum.
We should point out that concavity of ?7 in 5 and ^, of V in s, and of/
in f is not sufficient to ensure the concavity of i?, as can be seen by
twice differentiating X. However, for the logarithmic indirect utility
function which plays a central role in the following analysis, concavity
is ensured.
IV. Redundancy of Risk Markets and Constrained Pareto
Optimality
In the previous subsection, we derived a simple condition which
(together with the assumption of concavity) was both necessary and
sufficient for the market equilibrium to be a constrained Pareto op-
timum. We need, however, to interpret this condition, to see under
what circumstances it will be satisfied, in order to ascertain whether it
is likely that the market equilibrium is a constrained Pareto optimum.
The condition (18) can be thought of as a generalization of the
condition for full Pareto optimality, that the marginal rate of sub-
stitution between different states of nature be the same for all indi-
viduals. What equation (18) requires is that some kind of weighted-
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average marginal rate of substitution be the same. That is, we can
rewrite equation (18) as
^ ^ O , (19)
where dp/d^ is given by (17), and where
is the ratio of marginal rates of substitution between income in states
6 and 6, and where d is that state where the ratio of marginal utilities
equals \.
A special case of this arises when the marginal rates of substitution
are the same state by state, that is, V^ = \Uy for some value of X. In
that case, of course, if risk markets were opened up, there would be
no trade on them. We say that in these cases risk markets are redun-
dant. We thus have an immediate corollary of theorem 1.
Theorem 2.—A sufhcient condition for the constrained optimality of
the market equilibrium is the redundancy of risk markets.
If risk markets are redundant, the market equilibrium is a full
Pareto optimum.
We next ask three questions.
i) Are there restrictions on the utility functions which, for all pro-
duction functions, ensure the redundancy of risk markets?
ii) Are there weaker restrictions on the utility functions which, for
all production functions, ensure the constrained optimality of market
equilibrium? If there are not, then, in a sense, the conditions for risk
market redundancy are both necessary and sufficient for the con-
strained optimality of the market.
iii) Are there reasonable restrictions on the technology which, to-
gether with some weak restrictions on the utility functions, ensure the
constrained Pareto optimality of the market?
The first question is easy to answer: There are a set of (fairly
restrictive) assumptions under which (in our simple model) risk mar-
kets are always redundant. These conditions are set out below in
Section V.
The second question is more difficult to answer but provides one of
our key results: In Section VI we are able to show that redundancy of
risk markets is both necessary and sufficient for the market equilib-
rium to be a constrained Pareto optimum for all technologies. It turns
out that constrained Pareto optimality is critically as strong a condi-
tion as full Pareto optimality.
The final question is the most difficult, and Section VII provides
some insight into it.
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V. Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Risk Market
Redundancy
The set of conditions under which risk markets are redundant is
very restrictive. We first establish the following theorem.
Theorem 3a.—Sufficient conditions for the redundancy of risk mar-
kets are either that (1) there is no risk; or (2) producers are risk
neutral, and Vj^ = 0; or (3) consumers have an indirect utility function
of the form --
V = -klnp +6(/)(/), (20)
which corresponds to a direct utility function defined on consump-
tion, qy of the risky commodity and c of ''other goods": a In 17 + (1 - a)
In c, in the special case where 0 = In /.
Proof.—Condition 1 is trivial. (2) KVfp = 0, then consumers' margi-
nal utility of income, Fj, is constant in all states of nature; and if
producers are risk neutral, their marginal utility is constant in all
states of nature. Hence, the marginal rate of substitution between any
two states of nature is unity for both producers and consumers, or p in
equation (19) is unity, guaranteeing the redundancy of risk markets.
(3) The logarithmic indirect utility function generates, by Roy's for-
mula, demand curves which have unitary price elasticity. Hence,
farmers' income is constant. Hence, the marginal utility of farmers'
income is the same in all states. Moreover, Vfp = 0, so consumers'
marginal utility of income is the same in all states. Hence, the margi-
nal rate of substitution between income in all states is unity, and risk
markets are redundant.
These conditions are, in fact, necessary as well. If risk markets are
to be redundant, we require the ratio of the marginal utilities of






dlnQ ' Uy d\n(l dlnQ
where R is the coefficient of relative risk aversion of producers.
Similarly, the right-hand side of equation (21) gives
d\nV, _ dlnV, d
dlnQ dlnp dlnQ Vj e
Using (8), Vjp can be evaluated as follows: V[p = —{d/f ldI)Vi — q'^V,, =
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{Vjq^/I){-r} + /?'); R' = -{VjjI/Vj), where i?*" is consumers' relative
(income) risk aversion. Substituting into (23), and substituting (23)
and (22) into (21), we require for risk market redundancy that
- €) = - ^ ^ = a(r, - R^). (24)
Equation (24) can also be written (if e 7^ 1) as a condition relating
producers' attitudes to risk to consumers' behavioral characteristics:
R = ^(^R)_ (24')
1 — e
Equation (24) can be interpreted as a condition which must hold
between producers' and consumers' attitudes, as measured by
parameters R, R^, 17, a, and e, if risk markets are to be redundant
when there is risk. If producers are risk neutral, i? = 0; so for (24) to
be satisfied, Vjp must be zero. If (24) is to hold for all values of/?, e
must be unity, and Vjp = 0. But if Vjp = 0, the indirect utility function
must have the special form V = a{p) H- b4>{I), soq^ = —{a'/b(f>'). If the
elasticity of demand is unity, a' = —kip for some (positive) constant k\
hence, a = —k In p. We have thus established (if there is risk) the
following theorem.
Theorem 3b.—A necessary condition for risk market redundancy
with risk-neutral producers is that Vj^ = 0.
If risk markets are to be redundant regardless of the risk aversion
of producers, consumers must have a utility function of the form
V = -klnp -\~ b4>{I). (25)
These results are important in identifying the special set of circum-
stances in which the market attains not only a constrained Pareto
optimum but a full Pareto optimum.
VI. Necessary Conditions for Constrained Pareto Optimality
The sufficient conditions for the full optimality of the market are, of
course, very restrictive. We wish to know whether there are other
conditions which will lead the market equilibrium to be a constrained
Pareto optimum. For particular values of the parameters, the market
might happen to be a constrained Pareto optimum. But a small
perturbation of any of the functions involved in the analysis—the
consumer's utility function, the producer's utility function, the proba-
bility distribution of states, or the production function—might de-
stroy the constrained Pareto optimality of market equilibrium.
We establish here that the necessary conditions for the market
equilibrium to be a constrained Pareto optimum for all technologies
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are exactly the same as the conditions for redundancy of risk markets.
We establish this by looking at a special subset of technologies. There
are only two states of nature, which occur with probability TT and 1 —
77. There is a transformation curve facing each farmer,
92 = T{q,)^ (26)
where ,^- = output in state z, i = 1,2. The choice of technique has no
direct effect on utility, U^ = 0. For notational simplicity, we let/?^, f^^,
Uf, and so on equal price, income, and marginal utility of income in
state i, and we use dashes for derivatives. The farmer's first-order
condition (7) becomes
= 0, (27)
while the condition for the socially optimal choice of ^ (18) becomes
€2
- TT)T' - 7T)T',
(28)
where V^ip^) - V,{p^, I).
Substituting (16) and (27) into (28), we obtain as a necessary condi-




If equation (29) is to be satisfied identically for all technologies, it
must be satisfied identically for all values of ^i, 2^* and IT. Define
^ (30)
and
Xi = Vj{p,J)[\ -{oL,y)Jedl (31)
Equation (29) can be rewritten as
Expand the expected values and rearrange to give
h_\( 1 - ^ + Jh ^] = 0. (32)
If this is to hold for all values of TT, then
-, or ,, ,^ , = ,, ' , , (33)
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and the ratio of the marginal utilities is the same state by state. If this
is to be true for all technologies, this must hold for all values of (Q^,
Qi) or {p2ypi)- But this is precisely the condition we identified before
as the necessary condition for risk market redundancy (eq. 21).
We summarize our analysis in the following theorems.
Theorem 4.—A necessary condition for the constrained Pareto op-
timality of the market equilibrium for all technologies and for all
attitudes toward risk by farmers is that risk markets be redundant.
Theorem 5.—Only for those particular combinations of utility func-
tions of farmers and consumers which satisfy equation (24') will the
economy be a constrained Pareto optimum for all technologies.
VII. Restrictions on Technology Which Ensure Optimality
The previous section established that, without restrictions on the
technology, the necessary and sufficient conditions for the optimality
of the market equilibrium were precisely the conditions for the re-
dundancy of risk markets. If we impose restrictions on the set of
technologies, then we can obtain constrained Pareto optimality under
conditions which are weaker, but only slightly so. Using the kinds of
techniques used to prove theorems 2-5 we can establish the following
theorem.^
Theorem 6.—If producers face multiplicative risk, so f(6, f) =
g{d)h{^), a sufficient condition for constrained Pareto optimality is
that consumers' preferences can be represented by the indirect utility
function
V = {a+ bp)-^'n. (34)
The proof consists in showing that the term 1 — {ar)/€) of equation
(16) is constant for this function, which, together with multiplicative
risk, ensures that5(^'") = 0 in equation (18).
Theorem 7.—If individuals have homothetic indifference maps and
firms have multiplicative risk, then if, for all specifications of the
probability distribution of returns and producers' utility functions,
the market equilibrium is to be a constrained Pareto optimum, the
consumers' utility function must be of the form of equation (34).
Theorem 8.—If consumers' utility function is of the form of equation
(34) (which includes the constant demand elasticity as a special case),
then a necessary condition for constrained optimality is either that
risk markets be (locally) redundant or that there be multiplicative risk.
** For a more extended discussion of these theorems and proofs, see Newbery and
Stiglitz (1981).
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VIII. The Magnitude of the Distortions
In previous sections we have established conditions required for the
market equilibrium to be a constrained Pareto optimum. We would
like to be able to assess the magnitude and direction by which the
optimal value of ^  differs from the market equilibrium value. To do
this we define X(^) = Uypf^ + U^. The optimal choice of ^, ^", must
satisfy equation (13'), which we rewrite as
EX{^^) = ^ B{^o). (35)
In contrast, from (7) £X(f'") = 0.
The left-hand side of equation (35) can be expanded about the
market choice of technique, ^'", to find the direction and magnitude
of the bias away from the constrained efficient allocation:
o _ tm
In order to interpret this result, it is necessary to decide how best to
parameterize the choice of technique, ^. One natural method is to let ^
measure the standard deviation (or perhaps the coefficient of varia-
tion) of output, in which case equation (36) will measure the extent to
which the farmers choose insufficiently risky production, and the
right-hand side will typically depend on the degree of risk aversion
and the extent to which mean output increases as more risky tech-
niques are employed. Rather than derive various measures of the bias,
it might be more useful to illustrate the method for the two-state
example of Section VI. Moreover, the fundamental issue is how large
is the loss of welfare that results from the market's failure to achieve a
constrained Pareto optimum relative to the likely welfare gains to be
derived from specific policy intervention (such as price stabilization),
which we can calculate once the model has been fully specified.
Consider the special case in which there are equally probable states
of the world, and the production trade-off between output in the two
states of the world is linear:
q2 = T{q,)^a-bq,, b> 1. (37)
Suppose also that the choice of technique does not affect farmers'
welfare {U^ = 0) and that consumers have an indirect utility of the
form
\ , . (38)
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SO that price and income elasticities are unity, and their coefficient of
relative risk aversion is JR^ Suppose, finally, that the distribution of
income is satisfactory at the competitive equilibrium (i.e., we are only
interested in efficiency). In this simple model, farmers experience no
risk, and their welfare is independent of the state of the world and the
level of output, since (with equal numbers of consumers and farmers)
yt = Pi^i = oJ- The competitive equilibrium choice of ^1, -72 is given by
equation (27), which can be solved to give
^ ^ (39)
where ^'" and a'" are, respectively, mean output and its coefficient of
variation at the market equilibrium.
The constrained efficient solution is given by equation (28) (using
[27] and the fact that ej = 62 = 1):
^ PA ^ qA
\pj \qj
where /S = Q:(1 - R^). Hence, if y = 1/(1 - /3), then
^ ^ ^
where f^ is output in the optimal allocation in state i, q^ is mean
output, and cr^ is the coefficient of variation of output. \{R^ > 1, j8 <
0, and the optimal choice of technique involves less risk than the
market choice, while, if consumers are not very risk averse {R^ < 1),
then the market supplies too little risk. The optimum and competitive
equilibrium are shown below in figure 1 for the case i?"" < 1.
Since farmers enjoy the same income for any output (unit price
elasticity), their welfare is constant along the transformation frontier
AB. Consumers would, however, rather be at E than M, and the
inefficiency of competitive equilibrium can be measured by the
lump-sum tax on consumers' income which, if paid a t£ , would make
them no better off than at M. The benefit of moving from M to £
(equal to this lump sum) can be found by expanding consumers'
welfare in a Taylor series, and, as a fraction ,of consumer expenditure
on the commodity, is approximately
L - - ^ - ^ ~ ^^ Acr^ ; A^ =- Eq"" - Eq""
(41)
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FIG. 1.—The difference between market and efficient choice of technique
These terms can also be evaluated by Taylor series expansions, as-







Altogether, the proportional benefit from eliminating inefficiency is
approximately
L
2 ( 1 - (43)
Although this expression is of the order (o-'")^, it should be remem-
bered that if/?*" is not too large, ^ ^ a{\ — R^) is small, since the
expenditure share, a, for most commodities is very small. Thus, for
this particular parameterization, the welfare loss associated with the
production inefficiencies from incomplete markets will be small if
consumers' risk aversion is not too large. If it is, the loss may be
significant. In the more general case, the welfare loss will depend not
only on the magnitude of consumers' risk aversion but also on that of
producers and the elasticity of demand (see Newbery and Stiglitz, in
press).
IX. Optimal Corrective Tax Policy
The allocation described in Section III could be attained if the gov-
ernment could directly control ^, the choice of technique. One inter-
pretation of our finding is that the fundamental decentralization
theorem does not hold in the absence of a complete set of risk
markets, for it is not possible to achieve the constrained efficient
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allocation on competitive markets using only lump-sum taxes. Since
direct control is evidently impractical, it is necessary to inquire
whether there are tax policies which allow the constrained optimum
to be decentralized. This question raises some subtle issues.
For example, if the government levies an ad valorem tax on pro-
ducers, its tax revenue will depend on the state of the world, and we
must ask whether its budget is to be balanced in each state of the
world or only on the average. In the former case, the lump-sum
transfer will vary with the state of the world, while in the latter case
purchasing power will vary. It can, however, be shown that regardless
of the restrictions on feasible tax policies it is, in general, possible to
make Pareto improvements.
Let us consider the simplest case in which the government budget
must balance state by state and taxes can be at either constant ad
valorem rates or lump sum. We now establish the following theorem.
Theorem 9a.—A constant ad valorem tax rate (the proceeds of which
are distributed as lump-sum payments to producers),
, - V,)pf,le
\ EU.pf, '
supports the constrained Pareto optimum.
Proof.—Farmers will seiEUyp{l - r^)fi + EU^ = 0. Substituting for
the tax rate T*, this implies kE(Uypf^ + U^) - E{kUy - Vj)pf^le = 0,
which is the condition for constrained Pareto optimality of equation
(18').
Pareto improvements may even be attainable (under somewhat
more restrictive conditions) if the government is further restricted in
its instruments. Consider, for instance, the case where ^ has the
interpretation as the level of investment, and where producers' utility
function, accordingly, is written U = U{pf-\-s ~ f). Now assume that f
is observable, and the government imposes an investment tax at the
rate r with proceeds, r^, distributed to producers as lump-sum pay-
ments. Assume, moreover, that the government provides an addi-
tional lump-sum subsidy (tax) so that producers' expected utility is left
unchanged. Producers will now set EU'pf^ = EU'{1 + r), and the
required subsidy s is such that (at T = 0)
where dpidr is the total derivative of price with respect to the change
in policy. The effect of this policy on the representative consumer is
given by E[Vp{dp/dT) - Vj{ds/dr)], where 5 is the per capita tax on
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consumers to finance the producer subsidy. Using Roy's identity, (8),
and (45), we observe that
dV ^^ EVjfidp/dr) ^ EU'fidp/dr)
=^ U as
dr ^ EVj ^ EU'
It is immediate from our earlier analysis that the only conditions
under which equality will hold (for all technologies) will be those in
which risk markets are redundant; otherwise, there always exists an
investment tax or subsidy, accompanied by a lump-sum tax or sub-
sidy, which leaves producers unaffected and improves consumers'
welfare. Under more restrictive conditions, a lump-sum transfer from
consumers to producers (or conversely), unaccompanied by a pro-
duction tax or subsidy, may constitute a Pareto improvement.
X. Imperfectly Correlated Output Risk
We shall now show that if farmers do not have perfectly correlated
outputs, then, even under the stringent conditions in which the mar-
ket allocation is a constrained Pareto optimum with perfect correla-
tion, the market allocation is unlikely to be a constrained Pareto
optimum. We prove the following theorems.
Theorem 10a.—A sufficient condition for constrained Pareto opti-
mality with imperfectly correlated returns is the redundancy of risk
markets.
Theorem 10b.—Necessary and sufficient conditions for redundancy
of risk markets for all technologies are that all farmers be risk neutral
and Vj^ = 0.
Theorem 10c.—If the economy is to be a constrained Pareto op-
timum for all technologies, all farmers must be risk neutral and Vip =
0.
The first theorem is obvious: If risk markets are redundant, the
economy in fact attains a first-best optimum. Sufficiency in the second
theorem is also fairly trivial. If the marginal rates of substitution
between any two states are the same for all individuals, clearly risk
markets will be redundant; and they will be the same if the marginal
utility of income of all individuals is constant. But if all farmers are
risk neutral and Vjp = 0, clearly, the marginal utility of all producers
and all consumers is constant.
Necessity is only slightly more difficult to establish. If risk markets
are to be redundant, the marginal rates of substitution between in-
come in different states of nature must be the same for all farmers;
that is, letting U^(y^) represent the utility of the jih farmer as a
function of his income,/ , we require that U{/U^ be constant. Differ-
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entiating logarithmically with respect to aggregate output, Q, we ob-
tain
where q^ is the output of thej th farmer, and R^ is his relative risk
aversion. The quantity d In q^/d In Q measures the correlation between
thejth farmer's output and aggregate output. In the previous discus-
sion, this was assumed to be unity. However, in the more general case
with imperfect correlation this can take on any value; hence, if (46) is
to hold for all technologies, clearly /?-* = R^ = 0, all farmers must be
risk neutral. Moreover, if their marginal rate of substitution between
income in different states is unity, so must consumers', if risk markets
are to be redundant. But this implies Vjp = 0.
Theorem 10c is the most difficult to prove. To do this we first state a
characterization theorem for the constrained Pareto optimality of
markets with many producers which is the analogue to theorem 1.
(The proof is exactly parallel to that of theorem 1.)
Theorem 11.—A necessary condition for the rational expectations
equilibrium to be a constrained Pareto optimum is that
B'i^) - ^(^X'^^'^t/^ - F,] 4<^/l = 0, all I, (47)
where/'(^, ^') ~ the ith farmer's production function; k^ = Lagrange
multiplier associated with the Ath farmer's utility; and /3 '^ = q^/Q, share
of the k th farmer's output in aggregate output (^kP^ = 1) • Defining p^
as in (19'), we can rewrite (47) as
= E ( I - Y^p>^lBx\LuL.QJi^ = 0. (48)
This says that a necessary condition for the constrained Pareto opti-
mality of the market is that a particular weighted average of marginal
rates of substitution of producers and consumers be the same.
Since, from theorem 4, we already know that if the market is to be a
constrained Pareto optimum for all perfectly correlated technologies,
either farmers must be risk neutral and Vjp = 0 or consumers must
have logarithmic utility functions, in order to establish theorem 10c all
we need to do is to show that, for the logarithmic utility function, if
returns are not perfectly correlated, for some technologies (48) is not
satisfied. Consider the case where there are two symmetric groups of
farmers with N farmers of each type; the production functions of the
two groups are identical except for the effect of risk, which we assume
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is multiplicative and identically distributed:
i=j^L (49)
Given this symmetry in production, it is natural to assume symmetry
in social weight, \J = \^ = \ . The optimal lump-sum subsidy to the ilh
producer is derived as in Section III. We obtain, as the counterpart to
equation (16),
+ aE{Vj - \(3Vi - kf3'U',) = 0, i =7, k^ (50)
which, because of our symmetry assumptions, can be simplified to
since Vj is constant for the logarithmic utility function.
Under our special assumptions (47) may be simplified to
)(3\ i =j, k (52)
(where we have made use of _the fact that with multiplicative risk/^ =
and Q: = 1/2Q). By symmetry, E{/3yUi =
= E{1 - fi'y^U^, so equation (47) can be written
1/2F, - kE[{/3'y'Ui - (1 - /3 )^2t/^  + i3^U'^] = kEpVi. (53)
If fi^ is constant, then equation (51) implies (53) and optimality is
ensured; but fi^ will only be constant if the outputs of the two groups
of farmers are perfectly positively correlated, in which case the exam-
ple collapses into the earlier example of a single group of farmers. If
j8 is not constant, then equations (51) and (53) together require£'(^' —
i^)t/y = 0. But jS' and y^ are positively correlated (unless /S' is con-
stant), so, unless U\,y = 0 (farmers are risk neutral), £(^ ' — V2)U]j <
0. It is easily checked that, given the form of the indirect utility
function, total welfare is concave in the control variable. This estab-
lishes theorem 10c.
XI. Conclusions
This paper has shown that even when individuals have rational
expectations—they have fully absorbed all the information which is
available on the market and they use it efficiently in making their
production decisions—the market equilibrium is, in general, not even
a constrained Pareto optimum. Specific biases have been identified, in
the context of some simple models, but in more general situations, the
exact nature of the inefficiency may be hard to ascertain. The force of
our argument is that there is no presumption that market equilibria
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are efficient; indeed, there is a strong presumption that the market
equilibrium is not a constrained Pareto optimum.
In a sense, these results should not be surprising: When there is not
a complete set of markets, farmers will not have the right prices to use
in making their production decisions. Farmers pay attention only to
their own marginal rates of substitution across states of nature. In
general, these will differ from those of consumers because there is no
market to bring them into equality and, hence, the market allocation
will not be Pareto optimal.
There is another way of looking at these results which may prove
instructive. In a world of complete markets, insurance markets allo-
cate risk, and goods markets allocate goods; but in the absence of
insurance markets, the remaining goods markets have to serve both
functions. For example, if the source of the variability lies on the
supply side, and if demand is not too inelastic, the negative correla-
tion between price and output means that the output market transfers
some of the risk facing producers to consumers, and producers'
income variability will be less than their output variability. In a ra-
tional expectations equilibrium, each farmer correctly forecasts the
distribution of prices and chooses the level and riskiness of output to
maximize his expected utility. Together, these output decisions gen-
erate a distribution of total supply which in turn generates the price
distribution. No one farmer can influence the price distribution, but
each one is affected by it, and, collectively, their actions reproduce it.
The price distribution is, therefore, a public good, or collective con-
sumption good, and its form affects the level and distribution of
income risk. However, we already know that the competitive market
will, in general, fail to induce the optimum level of supply of public
goods, so it should come as no surprise that the output market does
not, in general, induce the optimum level of income risk.
If an omniscient planner were to decide on the choice of technique,
he would take account of the effect of supply on the price distribution
and, hence, on the distribution of risk. Insurance markets in this
context transform a public good (the whole price distribution) into a
set of private goods (one price for output in each state of the world).
Notice that the one-commodity world popular in early risk analysis is
very special, because income and output risk are the same, and there
is no public good element of a collectively produced price distribu-
tion.
There were basically two cases where the market allocation was
optimal. In the first, consumers had unitary price elasticity and all
farmers were identical. This meant that farmers faced no income risk.
They thus maximized their expected income. This coincides with
what consumers would like farmers to maximize, since price is pro-
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portional to the marginal utility of consumption of the given com-
modity.
In the second case, farmers are risk neutral and again maximize
expected income. As before, this would coincide with consumers'
objectives, if price were proportional to the marginal utility of con-
sumption of the commodity. However, this time the marginal utility to
consumers of increasing output and hence consumption, Q, in some
state of nature is UQ = pVj, and this is proportional to price, p, if Vf
does not vary wiihp, that is, Vjp = 0, so that consumers are price risk
neutral.
When there is more than one type of farmer, that is, when the
output of different farms is not perfectly correlated, these simple
relationships between output and income which we have assumed
above will not prevail. Even with unitary price elasticity, farmers will
still face income risk and, hence, will not maximize the value of their
output, so that even if consumers' marginal utility of consumption
were proportional to price, as with the logarithmic utility function,
consumers' interests would not be maximized by farmers. The only
general condition which ensures optimality is that consumers are
price risk neutral and farmers are income risk neutral.
Some readers have found the following alternative interpretation
of the nonoptimality of the market allocation instructive. Except
under unusual conditions (described in the text), the absence of a full
set of risk markets implies that the marginal rate of substitution
between income in different states of nature differs between consum-
ers and producers. Consider a production decision which increases
output in one state and decreases it in another. The market allocation
is made, as we have emphasized, with producers assuming the price
distribution is given. Now, by increasing output in one state and
decreasing it in another, the price will increase in one state and
decrease in the other; if the elasticity of demand is less than unity,
producers will be better off in the first and worse off in the second,
while consumers will be better off in the first and worse off in the
second. It is clear that such a marginal change can reduce the dif-
ference between consumers' and producers' marginal rates of sub-
stitution between the two states; thus, this production decision can
serve as a partial substitute for the risk market which is absent.
The important point is that it is only under very special circum-
stances that the market allocation will attain even the weak sense of
optimality implicit in our notion of constrained Pareto optimality.
This, in turn, has some important implications; there is, for instance,
a widespread belief that international buffer-stock schemes for the
stabilization of prices of agricultural commodities are unnecessary
and undesirable, since the market provides an "efficient" level of
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Storage.'^  Our analysis shows that this particular argument against
such schemes is not valid; indeed there is a presumption that the
market does not provide an efficient level of storage when there is an
incomplete set of risk markets.
More generally, we have shown that, in general, there exists some
tax policy which would generate a Pareto-optimal improvement over
existing market allocations. Our results suggest, moreover, that the
tax would depend sensitively on the specific form of production and
utility functions, while the calculations of Section VIII suggest that, if
risk aversion is not too large, the quantitative gain from such policies
may not be significant. Thus, while there is a strong presumption that
the market is not a constrained Pareto optimum, the desirability of
government intervention remains a moot question.
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